The Life-Cycle of Superpowers

John Bagot Glubb on the rise and fall of empires

Happy New Year to all readers! I am going to begin 2025 by republishing this Bow of Odysseus post from two years ago.

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Bonaparte devant le Sphinx by Jean-Léon Gérôme (1886).

Winston Churchill once remarked that, ‘The farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see’.  This in essence encapsulates the importance of the study of the past to understanding future trends and consequently to strategic planning. Unfortunately, a wide grasp of historical patterns is seriously lacking in the teaching of history as a discipline. And although this problem is rather pronounced in our own time, it is by no means a new development. In the 1970s, the retired soldier John Bagot Glubb wrote a couple of articles for Blackwood’s Magazine on the recurrent patterns of ascendancy and decline that have occurred throughout history. In 1978, these articles were combined to form The Fate of Empires and Search for Survival.¹ The central theme is why great powers rise and fall. Briefly put, Glubb contended that all empires—by which he essentially means superpowers—have a lifespan of around 250 years and appear to go through the same processes of ascendancy, prosperity and decline. This pattern occurs regardless of the geographical location of a particular empire or the period of history in which it lives. It does not even appear to matter what state of technological progress, speed of travel or nature of weaponry exists. As a general rule, the 250-year lifespan appears to hold.

A global approach to history

John Bagot Glubb was born in 1897 and was the son of a soldier. He himself became a soldier too and after time at the Royal Military Academy in Woolwich was commissioned in the Royal Engineers and served during the First World War. For six years during the 1920s he served as a regular officer in Iraq after volunteering for service there but resigned his commission in 1926 and entered into an administrative post with the Iraq government. In 1930 he signed a contract with the Transjordanian Government and in 1939 entered his longest-lasting post as commander of the Jordanian Army, a position he would hold until 1956. It is clear that he had a particular affinity for Arab history, something which featured strongly in The Fate of Empires, and which he considered to mirror closely the lifespan of the British Empire.

Glubb did not think that history in his own lifetime was taught particularly well. It was limited to short periods, the slant of which was too often governed by national vanity rather than objectivity. As to world history, educational interest touched only on short unconnected periods with no sense of the intervals between or the broader picture. He preferred an international approach. History, for him, should be the history of the human race, not of one country or period.

Glubb in 1953.

The lifespan of empires

Many of the great empires of history lasted for around 250 years or so. As examples, Glubb refers to Assyria 859-612 BC (247 years), Persia 538-330 BC (208 years), the Greece of Alexander and his successors 331-100 BC (231 years), the Roman Republic 260-27 BC (233 years), the Roman Empire 27 BC- AD 180 (207 years), the Arab Empire 634-880 (246 years), the Mameluke Empire 1250-1517 (267 years), the Ottoman Empire 1320-1570 (250 years), Spain 1500-1750 (250 years), Romanov Russia 1682-1918 (234 years) and the British Empire 1700-1950 (250 years). Of course, as he stated, empires do not tend to have definite start and end points as such so these are broad generalisations. And we could query some of the dates in question. For example, why does the Venetian-Ottoman War of 1570 signify the end of the Ottoman Empire as opposed to the more usual date of 1918? Despite this, there does seem to be a general pattern, which if we assume a generation to represent around 25 years, equates to ten generations. Each empire goes through six stages or ages—the Age of Pioneers, the Age of Conquests, the Age of Commerce, the Age of Affluence, the Age of Intellect and the Age of Decadence.

From emergence to conquest

All great powers emerge from small insignificant states. Yet the transformation can occur remarkably fast. As Glubb reminds us, before Philip II (359-336 BC) Macedon was not an important state and was not even considered wholly Greek by most contemporary Greeks. In those days the Persians were the sole superpower. Yet only 36 years after Philips’s accession, the Persian Empire no longer existed while the Macedonian Greek empire stretched from the Danube to India and included Egypt, Babylon and Persia. The second example given is the rise of the Arabs. In the year 600, power was contested by two rival superpowers, the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire and the Sassanid Persian Empire. At that time the Arabs were chiefly wandering tribes, with no government or military force to speak of. Following the emergence and rise of Islam, the Arabs exploded out of the Arabian Peninsular and attacked both superpowers. Within 20 years the Sassanids were gone. Within just a few decades more the Arabs had extended their empire from the Atlantic Ocean to Northern India and the very edges of China in the east.

As Glubb states, there are many examples of outbursts of small powers. There are, however, common characteristics shared by all new conquerors. They are aggressive and enterprising and although often poor, possess a strength of will that is not typically shared by decaying empires, whose wealth and luxury makes them defensive-minded. Typical physical obstacles do not tend to prove barriers for long for such enterprising attackers. Outward expansion tends to be accompanied by a forceful optimism—‘where there is a will there is a way’—and such adventurers find ways and means to traverse mountains, jungles or vast oceans. Of course, we could also draw attention to Europe from the days of the great explorations of the early modern era (from Vasco da Gama to Francis Drake) to American pioneers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The age of outbursts is thus followed by the age of conquests. The confidence of an ascendant power is matched by ingenuity. Older empires tend to rely on tried and trusted methods of governance and warfare but thinking which may have been fresh and dynamic in an earlier age can easily become calcified. Improvisation is replaced by tradition for the sake of tradition and thus such older powers can become weak and vulnerable.

Commercial expansion and affluence

Once an ascendant power has established itself militarily, the conquest of vast areas of new lands obviously provides numerous economic incentives. The transport of merchants and goods over great distances becomes feasible. A level of trade becomes possible which in the earlier days of conquest seemed distant and remote. As Glubb reminds us, the Mongols may have been some of the most brutally effective conquerors in a military sense, notable for massacring entire populations, yet by the thirteenth century when their empire extended from China to Hungary, the caravan trade along the Silk Road facilitated a tremendous amount of prosperity.

Trade brings great wealth and great wealth in turn finds outlets in numerous ways. Rich patrons support great architectural projects and art flourishes. While initially the old virtues are still taught and encouraged and public life is still marked by a sense of duty, it always tends to be that affluence ultimately is accompanied by a wider complacency. The desire to become rich supersedes the earlier desire to achieve honour and fame through service. Interestingly, Glubb notes that this shift is mirrored in changes to the education system, where learning for the sake of scholarship and virtue is no longer the prime driving force but rather learning to enable one to grow rich.

Outwardly, the transition from the Age of Conquest to the Age of Affluence is also marked by a defensive posture. No longer interested in pursuing glory, a nation loses its assertiveness and becomes intent on retaining its prosperity. Another important component in this age, according to Glubb’s thesis, is the emergence of intellectualism, which sees great advances in natural sciences. It also tends to leads to excessive debate with no overriding unified purpose. Glubb’s concern with intellectualism (note this is an overemphasis on intellectual matters not a deprecation of intelligence), is that it can destroy the spirit of self-sacrifice necessary for a nation to thrive.

‘Yet there are times when the perhaps unsophisticated self-dedication of the hero is more essential than the sarcasms of the clever.’

This intellectualism extends to the point where it is believed that problems can be eradicated purely through the application of the intellect and consequently ‘education’ is elevated to the highest possible good. There is a lot that could be said about this for our own time (although we have probably been living in this phase since the end of the Second World War). Today, a lot of public intellectualism appears to have devolved more into forms than substance, characterised by a self-congratulatory ‘cleverness’ (the triumph of the midwit) than either competence or thumos. It is surely no accident that real, genuine innovation has slowed considerably during this period, but that is beyond my scope here.

From affluence to decline

In the great lifecycle of superpowers, decline begins during the second half of the Age of Affluence. In Glubb’s view this is evident in a number of ways. One is a rise in dissension and disunity. Political rivalries intensify. This was apparent during the latter stages of the Byzantine Empire. When the remaining rump of what had been a majestic empire was threatened with complete conquest by the Turks, Byzantium’s leaders ought to have been united and acted with a singular purpose in defence of their homeland. In reality, they spent much of the last fifty years of the empire fighting each other in a series of civil wars, growing weaker and weaker until the Turks finally crushed the last defence in 1453. Glubb also points to the increasing cosmopolitanism of the capitals of empires during periods of decline. Great affluence tends to attract people from every corner of an empire to its capital. However, long-standing in-group loyalty threatens the unity of a nation during periods of trial and conflict. This is not because one group is innately superior or inferior to another but simply that, human nature being what it is, differences tend to result in division.

Another key component of decline is a pervasive frivolity, which tends to accompany widespread pessimism. This can be contrasted with the resilient optimism which tends to dominate during periods of ascendancy. He points to the example of Rome. Republican Rome was repeatedly threatened with extinction yet no such perils shook the confidence of the republic. The later Roman Empire, on the other hand, was deeply pessimistic and lost its will. As an aside it is interesting how pessimism tends to be accompanied by certain types of philosophy. Could something like the stoicism of Marcus Aurelius have appeared during the days of Cato the Elder or Gaius Marius or Scipio Africanus? Probably not.

In Glubb’s view, decadence refers to the disintegration of the system rather than of its individual members. The decline of a nation does not necessarily mean the decline of ‘the energies or the basic character of its members’:

‘Decadence is both mental and moral deterioration, produced by the slow decline of the community from which its members cannot escape, as long as they remain in their old surroundings. But, transported elsewhere, they soon discard their decadent ways of thought, and prove themselves equal to the other citizens of their adopted country.’

‘Decadence is a moral and spiritual disease, resulting from too long a period of wealth and power, producing cynicism, decline of religion, pessimism and frivolity.’

The life-cycle expressed in a popular meme.

A universal pattern?

While empires tend to follow similar trajectories, summarised in these six ‘Ages’, the ways in which they eventually fall of course differ. The Roman Empire broke into two, the Western half succumbing to successive barbarian invasions, the Eastern half transforming into Byzantium. The vast Arab empire broke up into many pieces, Muslim Spain following its own course for around 250 years before its own demise. There is no particular end set in stone for an empire. Only that hubris and complacency tends to secure its eventual destruction.

Glubb was obviously not the first person to consider the rise and fall of great powers. Examples of this important genre are available throughout history from Plutarch to Edward Gibbon to Oswald Spengler. It is also possible to be pedantic over details of Glubb’s thesis. He himself admitted that its geographical scope was limited to those areas forming the modern West and the Middle East. The lack of attention on India, China and South America is not the result of perceived irrelevance or lack of interest but rather because he admitted he did not know much about them. In essence the essay served as a starting point for serious future study of the life-cycle of great powers, something rendered difficult by the inadequate scope of most historical education. But any weaknesses in the details ought not to distract from the strength of the overall concept.

Finally, the inescapable question that emerges from a study like this is whether or not this pattern is always inevitable. Glubb offers no solution to this problem and wonders whether it is something divinely ordained. His conclusion offers some interesting remarks, with which I conclude this particular précis.

‘The weaknesses of human nature, however, are so obvious, that we cannot be too confident of success. Men bursting with courage, energy and self-confidence cannot easily be restrained from subduing their neighbours, and men who see the prospect of wealth open to them will not readily be prevented from pursuing it.

Perhaps it is not in the real interest of humanity that they should be so prevented, for it is in the periods of wealth that art, architecture, music, science and literature make the greatest progress.’

1. The original essay is available here.